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Abstract.
We introduce the confident voter model, in which each voter can be in one of two
opinions and can additionally have two levels of commitment to an opinion — confident
and unsure. Upon interacting with an agent of a different opinion, a confident voter
becomes less committed, or unsure, but does not change opinion. However, an unsure
agent changes opinion by interacting with an agent of a different opinion. In the mean-
field limit, a population of size N is quickly driven to a mixed state and remains close
to this state before consensus is eventually achieved in a time of the order of lnN . In
two dimensions, the distribution of consensus times is characterized by two distinct
times — one that scales linearly with N and another that appears to scale as N3/2.
The longer time arises from configurations that fall into long-lived states that consist
of two (or more) single-opinion stripes before consensus is reached. These stripe states
arise from an effective surface tension between domains of different opinions.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a
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1. INTRODUCTION
The voter model [1] describes the evolution toward consensus in a population of N
agents, each of which can be in one of two possible opinion states. In an update event, a
randomly-selected voter adopts the state of a randomly-selected neighbor. As a result of
repeated update events, a finite population necessarily reaches consensus in a time TN
that scales as a power law in N (with a logarithmic correction in two dimensions) [1, 2].
Because of its simplicity and its natural connection to opinion dynamics, the voter
model has been extensively investigated (see, e.g., [3, 4]). The connection with
social phenomena has also motivated efforts to extend the voter model to incorporate
various aspects of social reality, such as, among others, stubbornness/contrarianism [5–
8], multiple states [9, 10], internal dissonance [11], individual heterogeneity [12],
environmental heterogeneity [13–16], vacillation [17], and non-linear interactions [18, 19].
These studies have uncovered many new phenomena that are still being actively
explored.
Our investigation was initially motivated by recent social experiments of
Centola [20], who studied the spread of a specific behavior in a controlled online network
where reinforcement played a crucial role. Reinforcement means that an individual
adopts a particular state only after receiving multiple prompts to adopt this behavior
from socially-connected neighbors. These experiments found that social reinforcement
played a decisive role in determining how a new behavior is adopted [20].
Previous research that has a connection with this type of reinforcement mechanism
include the q-voter model [19], where multiple same-opinion neighbors initiate change,
the naming game, and the AB model [21]. An example that is perhaps most closely
connected to reinforcement arises in the noise-reduced voter model [22], where a voter
keeps a running total of inputs towards changing opinions, but actually changes opinions
only when this counter reaches a predefined threshold. A similar notion of reinforcement
arises in a model of fad and innovation dynamics [23] and in a model of contagion
spread [24]. The use of multiple discrete opinions is not the only option for incorporating
varying opinion strength. Previous models have used a continuous range of opinions
quantifying the tendency for an agent to change its opinion. [25] For example, in the
bounded confidence model, an agent can possesses an opinion in a continuous range, with
the spatial distance between points representing the difference in those opinions. [26]
In this paper, we study how reinforcement affects the dynamics of the voter model.
In ourconfident voter model , we assume that agents possess some modicum of intrinsic
confidence in their beliefs and, unlike the classic voter model, need multiple prompts
before changing their opinion state. We investigate a simple realization of this confident
voting in which each opinion state is further demarcated into two substates of different
confidence levels. The basic variables are thus the opinion of each voter and the
confidence level with which this opinion is held. For concreteness, we label the two
opinion states as plus (P) and minus (M). Thus the possible states of an agent are P0 and
P1 for confident and unsure plus agents, respectively, and correspondingly M0 and M1
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for minus agents (Fig. 1). The new feature of confident voting is that a confident agent
does not change opinion by interacting with an agent of a different opinion. Instead
such an agent changes from being confident to being unsure of his opinion. On the
other hand, an unsure agent changes opinion by interacting with any agent of the other
opinion, as in the classic voter model.
We define two variants of confident voting that accord with common anecdotal
experience (Fig. 1). In the marginal version, an unsure agent that changes opinion still
remains unsure. Such an agent is often labelled a “flip-flopper”, a routinely-invoked
moniker by American politicians to characterize political opponents. Figuratively, an
agent who switches opinion remains ambivalent about the new opinion state and can
switch back. In the extremal version, an unsure agent becomes confident after an opinion
change. Such an agent “sees the light” and therefore becomes fully committed to the
new opinion state. This behavior is typified by Paul the Apostle, who switched from
being dedicated to finding and persecuting early Christians to embracing Christianity
after experiencing a vision of Jesus.
confident
P
P0
1 P
P0
11M
M0
(a)
1M
M0
(b)
unsure
Figure 1. Illustration of the states and possible transitions in the: (a) marginal,
and (b) extremal versions of the confident voter model. Dashed arrows indicate
possible confidence level changes (biased toward higher confidence), while solid
arrows indicate possible opinion change events.
2. MEAN-FIELD DESCRIPTION
The basic variables are the densities of the four types of agents. We use P0, P1,M0,M1
to denote both the agent types and their densities. In the mean-field description, a pair
of agents is randomly selected, and the state of one the two agents, chosen equiprobably,
changes according to the voter-like dynamics illustrated in Fig. 1. We now outline the
time evolution for the two variations of the confident voter model.
2.1. Marginal Version
For writing the rate equations, we first enumerate the possible outcomes when a pair of
agents interact:
M1P1 → M1M1 or P1P1; M0P0 → M0P1 or M1P0;
P0 P1 → P0 P1 or P0P0; M0M1 → M0M1 or M0M0;
M1P0 → M1P1 or P0P1; M0P1 → M1P1 or M0M1.
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That is, the interaction between two unsure agents of opposite opinions (M1P1) leads
to no net density change, as in the classic voter model. However, when two confident
agents of different opinions meet (M0 P0), one of the agents becomes unsure. The next
two lines account for interactions between agents of the same opinion but different
confidence levels. We assume that an unsure agent exerts no influence on a confident
agent by virtue of the latter being confident, while a confident agent is persuasive and
converts an unsure agent to confident. Finally, the last line accounts for an unsure agent
changing opinion upon interacting with a confident agent of a different opinion.
The corresponding rate equations are:
P˙0 = −(M0 +M1)P0 + P0P1 ≡ −MP0 + P0P1 , (1)
P˙1 = MP0 − P0P1 + (M1P0 −M0P1) ,
with parallel equations for M0 and M1 that are obtained by interchanging M ↔ P in
Eq. (1). The rate equation for the total density of plus agents is
P˙ =M1P0 −M0P1,
and from the complementary equation for M˙ , it is evident that the total density of
agents is conserved, P˙ + M˙ = 0.
2.2. Extremal Version
For the extremal version, we again enumerate the possible outcomes when a pair of
agents interact. These are:
M1 P1 → P0P1 or M0M1; M0 P0 → M0P1 or M1P0;
P0 P1 → P0P1 or P0P0; M0M1 → M0M1 or M0M0;
M1 P0 → M1P1 or P0P0; M0 P1 → M1P1 or M0M0.
The point of departure, compared to the marginal version, is that a voter is now confident
in its new opinion state upon changing opinion. The rate equations corresponding to
these steps are:
P˙0 = −M0P0 +M1P1 + P0P1 , (2)
P˙1 = M0P0 −M1P1 − P0P1 + (M1P0−M0P1) ,
with parallel equations for M0 and M1. The rate equation for the total density of plus
agents is the same as that for the marginal version, so that again the total density of
agents is manifestly conserved.
2.3. Time Evolution
For both variants of the confident voter model, the time evolution is dominated by the
presence of a saddle point that corresponds not to consensus, but a balance between
plus and minus agents. For nearly-symmetric initial conditions, the densities of the
different species are initially attracted to this unstable fixed point, but eventually flow
to a stable fixed point that corresponds to consensus. However when the initial condition
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is perfectly symmetric between plus and minus agents, then the population is driven to
a mixed state that corresponds to the symmetric saddle point (Fig. 2).
2.3.1. Symmetric System It is instructive to first study the initial conditions M0(0) =
P0(0) = 1/2 and M1(0) = P1(0) = 0. The rate equations (1) for the marginal version of
confident voting now reduce to P˙0 = −P˙1 = −P 20 , with solution
P0(t) = P0(0)/[1 + P0(0)t] , (3)
P1(t) =
1
2
− P0(t) .
Thus in an initially symmetric system, confident voters are slowly eliminated because
there is no mechanism for their replenishment, and all that remains asymptotically are
equal densities of unsure voters.
For the extremal version of confident voting, the rate equations (2) reduce to
P˙0 = −P˙1 = P 20 +
1
2
P0 − 1
4
(4)
= −(P0 − λ+)(P0 − λ−) ,
with λ± =
1
4
(−1 ± √5) ≈ 0.309,−0.809. Because the quadratic polynomial on the
right-hand side of Eq. (4) is positive for P0 < λ+ and negative for P0 > λ+, the fixed
point at λ+ is stable. Thus P0(t) approaches λ+ exponentially in time. We solve for P0
by a partial fraction expansion to give
P0(t)− λ+
P0(t)− λ− =
P0(0)− λ+
P0(0)− λ− e
−(λ+−λ−)t , (5)
which indeed gives an exponential approach to the final state of P0 =
1
2
− P1 = λ+.
Thus all four voting states are represented in the long-time limit.
2.3.2. Non-Symmetric System If the initial condition is slightly non-symmetric, then
numerical integrations of the rate equations clearly show that the evolution of the
densities turns out to be controlled by two distinct time scales — a fast time scale
that is O(1) and a longer time scale that is O(lnN), where N is the population size.
To incorporate N in the rate equations, we interpret these equations as describing
the dynamics of voters that live on a complete graph of N ≫ 1 sites, so that every
agent interacts equiprobably with any other agent. In this framework, consensus on the
complete graph should be viewed as the density of a single species being equal to 1− 1
N
in the rate equations. Similarly, an initial small deviation ǫ = 1
N
from the symmetric
initial conditions in the rate equations (i.e., P0(0) =
1
2
+ ǫ and M0(0) =
1
2
− ǫ, with
ǫ = 1
N
), should be interpreted as the departure from a symmetric state by a single
particle on a complete graph of N sites.
In the marginal model (Fig. 2(a)), the system begins to approach the point
M1 = P1 =
1
2
algebraically in time, as discussed above. For a slightly asymmetric
initial condition, the densities remain close to this unstable fixed point for a time that
numerical integration shows is of order lnN . Ultimately, the system is driven to the
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Figure 2. Evolution of the densities for the: (left) marginal and (right) extremal
models with the near-symmetric initial condition P0 = 0.50001, M0 = 0.49999,
and P1 = M1 = 0.
fixed point that corresponds to the initial majority opinion. For the extremal model,
qualitatively similar behavior occurs, except that in the initial stages of evolution the
system is quickly driven towards the fixed point at P0 = M0 = λ+ and P1 =
1
2
−λ+. This
fixed point is a saddle node, with one stable and two unstable directions (Fig. 2(b)).
Thus for nearly-symmetric initial conditions, the densities remain close to this fixed
point for a time of the order lnN , after which the densities are suddenly driven to one
of the two stable fixed points, either M0 = 1 or P0 = 1.
P1
P0
M0 M1(a) M1
P1
(b)
0
M0
P
Figure 3. Composition tetrahedron for the: (a) marginal and (b) extremal
models. Shown in (a) are the consensus fixed points (dots), the unstable fixed
line (thick), and the symmetry line P0 = M0, P1 = M1 (dashed arrow) that
terminates in a symmetric fixed point (circle). Shown in (b) are the unstable
(circle) and stable (dots) fixed points. For both cases, two representative flows
that start from nearly symmetric initial conditions are shown.
The full state space is the composition tetrahedron, which consists of the
intersection of the set {P0, P1,M0,M1|Pi,Mi ≤ 1} with the normalization constraint
plane P0+P1+M0+M1 = 1 (Fig. 3). Each corner corresponds to a pure system that is
entirely comprised of the labeled species. For the marginal version, there are only two
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stable fixed points at P0 = 1 andM0 = 1, corresponding to consensus of either confident
plus voters or confident minus voters. There is also a fixed line, defined by P1+M1 = 1,
where the population consists only of unsure agents. This fixed line is locally unstable
except at the point P1 = M1 =
1
2
. Thus if the system starts along the symmetry line
defined by P0 = M0 and P1 = M1, the system flows to the final state of P1 = M1 =
1
2
.
However, near-symmetric initial states execute a sharp U-turn and eventually flow to
one of the consensus fixed points P0 = 1 or M0 = 1, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
For the extremal version, qualitatively similar dynamics arises, except that instead
of a fixed line, there is an unstable fixed point at P0 =M0 = λ+ and P1 =M1 =
1
2
−λ+.
Nearly symmetric initial states first flow to this unstable fixed point and remain in the
vicinity of this point for a time scale that is of order lnN , after which the densities
quickly flow to the consensus fixed points, either M0 = 1 or P0 = 1.
3. CONFIDENT VOTING ON LATTICES
We now investigate confident voting dynamics when voters are situated on the sites of a
finite-dimensional lattice of linear dimension L (with N = Ld), with periodic boundary
conditions. For the classic lattice voter model, it was found that the consensus time
TN asymptotically scales as N
2 in one dimension d = 1, as N lnN for d = 2, and as
N for d > 2 [1, 2]. The presence of the logarithmic factor for d = 2 and the lack of
dimension dependence for d > 2 shows that the critical dimension dc = 2 for the classic
voter model.
The confident voter model has quite different dynamics because the magnetization is
not conserved, except in the symmetric limit P0 = M0 and P1 =M1, whereas the average
magnetization is conserved in the classic voter model [1, 2]. Here the magnetization is
defined as the difference in the densities of plus and minus voters of any kind. The
absence of this conservation law leads to an effective surface tension between domains
of plus and minus voters [22]. Consequently confident voting is closer in character to
the kinetic Ising model with single-spin flip dynamics at low temperatures rather than
to the classic voter model.
3.1. One Dimension
In the simplest case of one dimension, the agents organize at long times into domains
that are in a single state and the evolution is determined by the motion of the interface
between two dissimilar domains. Thus we consider the evolution of a single interface
between two semi-infinite domains — for example, one in state P0 and the other in state
M0. By enumerating all possible ways that the voters at the interface can evolve (Fig. 4),
we find that the domain wall moves one site to the left or to the right equiprobably after
four time steps. Thus isolated interfaces between domains undergo a random walk, but
with the domain wall hopping at one-fourth the rate of a symmetric nearest-neighbor
random walk.
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Figure 4. First three evolution steps of an interface between a P0 and M0
domain. Voters that change their state are shown green. After one more step,
a sharp domain wall that is translated by ±1 lattice spacing is re-established.
Similarly, we determine the fate of two adjacent diffusing domain walls by studying
the evolution of a single voter in state M0 in a sea of P0 voters. By again enumerating
the possible ways these two adjoining interfaces evolve, we find that the domain walls
annihilate with probability 1/2 and move apart by one lattice spacing with probability
1/2. Additionally, we verified that the distribution of survival times for a single confident
voter in a sea of opposite-opinion voters scales as S(t) ≡ t−1/2, as in the classic voter
model. We also studied the analogous single-defect initial condition for unsure voters. In
all such cases, the long-time behavior is essentially the same as in the classic voter model,
albeit with an overall slower time scale. Finally, we confirmed that the time to reach
consensus starting from an arbitrary initial state scales quadratically with N . Thus the
one-dimensional confident voter model at long times exhibits the same evolution as the
classic voter model, but with a rescaled time.
3.2. Two Dimensions
In our simulations of confident voting in two dimensions, we typically start a population
with exactly one-half of the voters in the confident plus state and one-half in the
confident minus state, with their locations randomly distributed. Periodic boundary
conditions are always employed. For both the marginal and the extremal versions of
confident voting, TN appears to grow algebraically in N , with an exponent that is
visually close to 3
2
(Fig. 5). However, the local two-point slopes in the plot of lnTN
versus lnN are slowly and non-monotonically varying with N so that it is difficult to
make a precise estimate of the exponent value.
We argue that this slow approach to asymptotic behavior arises because there are
two different routes by which consensus is achieved. For random initial conditions,
most realizations reach consensus by domain coarsening, a process that ends with the
formation of a large single-opinion droplet that engulfs the system. However, for a
substantial fraction of realizations (roughly 38% for the extremal model and 42% for
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Figure 5. (left) Average consensus time TN on the square lattice as a function
of N . For both models, the initial number of confident plus and minus voters
are equal and randomly-distributed in space. The number of realizations for
the largest system size is 40, 000. (right) Local two-point exponent for the
consensus time for the marginal and extremal models. The error bars indicate
the statistical uncertainty.
the marginal model), voters first segregate into alternating stripe-like enclaves of plus
and minus voters (Fig. 6). This feature is akin to what occurs in the two-dimensional
Ising model with zero-temperature Glauber dynamics, where roughly one-third of all
realizations fall into a stripe state (which happens to be infinitely long lived at zero
temperature [27–29]). A similar condensation into stripe states also occurs in the
majority vote model [30], the AB model, the naming game [21], and now the confident
voter model. It is striking that this symmetry breaking occurs in a wide range of non-
equilibrium systems for which the underlying dynamics is symmetric in x and y. It is
an open challenge to understand why this symmetry breaking occurs.
Figure 6. Typical configurations of the extremal version of the confident voter
model on a 30 × 30 square lattice that reach either a stripe state (left) or an
island state (right). Black and white pixels correspond to unsure plus and minus
agents; these form a sharp interface between domains of confident agents.
The existence of these two distinct modes of evolution is reflected in the probability
distribution of consensus times P (TN) (Fig. 7). Starting from the random but
symmetrical initial condition, the distribution P (TN) first has a sharp peak at a
characteristic time that scales linearly with N , and then a distinct exponential tail
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whose characteristic decay time scales as N3/2. The shorter time scale corresponds to
the subset of realizations that reach consensus by conventional coarsening. For these
realizations, the length scale ℓ of the coarsening grows as
√
t. When this coarsening scale
reaches L, consensus is achieved. The consensus time is thus given by ℓ = L =
√
t; since
N ∝ L2, we have TN ≃ N . The longer time scale stems from the subset of realizations
that fall into a stripe state before consensus is eventually reached.
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
102 103 104 105 106
TN
P(TN)
Marginal
Extremal
Figure 7. Consensus time distribution for a 64 × 64 system on a double
logarithmic scale. The initial condition is the same as in Fig. 5 and the data
are based on 750,000 realizations.
To help understand the quantitative nature of the approach to consensus via the
two different routes of coarsening and stripe states, we studied the confident voter model
with the initial conditions of: (i) a large circular single-opinion island and (ii) a stripe
state (Fig. 8). For the former, the initial condition is a circular region of radius r that
contains agents in state M0, surrounded by agents in state P0. For the latter, agents in
state P0 occupy the top half of the system, while the bottom half is occupied of agents
in state M0. For these two initial conditions, the consensus time TN grows as N and as
N3/2, respectively (Fig. 8). In the latter case, the approach to asymptotic behavior is
both non-monotonic and extremely slow (Fig. 8); we do not understand the mechanism
responsible for these anomalies. These limiting behaviors account for the two time scales
that arise in the distribution of consensus times for a system with a random, symmetric
initial condition.
Although the confident voter model has an appreciable probability of falling into
a stripe state, such a state is not stable because the interface between the domains
can diffuse. When the two interfaces of a stripe diffuse by a distance that is of the
order of their separation, one stripe is cut in two and resulting droplet geometry quickly
evolves to consensus. We estimate the time for two such interfaces to meet by following
essentially the same argument as that developed for the majority vote model [30]. For a
flat interface, every site on the interface can change its opinion. Such an opinion change
moves the local position of the interface by ±1. For a smooth interface of length L, there
will therefore be of the order of L±√L opinion change events of plus to minus and vice
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Figure 8. (left) Average consensus time for the extremal model on the square
lattice as a function of the population size for: (i) island and (ii) stripe initial
configurations. For the stripe initial condition, the data for the largest system
size is based on 13,000 realizations. The stripe-state data has been vertically
displaced for clarity. (right) The local two-point exponent for TN for an initial
stripe state. The error bars indicate the statistical uncertainty.
versa. Thus the net change in the number of agents of a given opinion is of the order
of ±√L. Consequently, the average position of the interface moves by √L/L = 1/√L.
Correspondingly the diffusion coefficient DL of the interface scales as 1/L. The time for
two such interfaces that are separated by a distance of the order of L to meet therefore
scales as L2/DL ∼ L3 ∼ N3/2.
In a d-dimensional system, the analog of two-stripe state is a two-slab state with
a (d − 1)-dimensional interface separating the slabs. Now the same argument as that
give above leads to N (d+1)/d as the time scale for two initially flat interfaces to meet.
According to this approach, the consensus time scales linearly with N in the limit of
d → ∞, a limit that one normally associates with the mean-field limit. However, the
rate equation approach gives a consensus time that grows as lnN . We do not know how
to resolve this dichotomy.
4. Summary
We introduced the notion of individual confidence in the context of the voter model.
Our model is based on recent social experiments that point to the importance of multiple
reinforcing inputs as an important influence for adopting a new opinion or behavior [20].
We studied two variants of confident voting in which an agent who has just switched
opinion will be either have confidence in the new opinion — the extremal model — or
be unsure of the new opinion — the marginal model. In the mean-field limit, a nearly
symmetric system quickly evolves to an intermediate metastable state before finally
reaching a consensus in one of the confident opinion states. This intermediate state is
reached in a time of the order of one, while the time to reach consensus scales as lnN .
On a two-dimensional lattice, a substantial fraction of all realizations of a random
initial condition reach a long-lived stripe state before ultimate consensus is reached. This
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phenomenon appears ubiquitously in related opinion and spin-dynamics models [27–
30]) and an understanding of what underlies this dynamical symmetry-breaking is still
lacking. An important consequence of the stripe states is that there are two independent
times that describe the approach to consensus. The shorter time, which scales linearly
with N , corresponds to realizations that reach consensus by domain coarsening. The
longer time corresponds to realizations that get stuck in a metastable stripe state before
ultimately reaching consensus.
An unexpected feature of confident voting is that the behavior in two dimensions,
where the consensus time TN varies as a power law in N , is drastically different than
that of the mean-field limit, where TN varies logarithmically with N . In contrast, in the
classic voter model, TN ∼ N lnN in two dimensions, whereas the mean-field behavior is
TN ∼ N . This dichotomy suggests that confident voting on the complete graph does not
correspond to the limiting behavior of confident voting on a high-dimensional hypercubic
lattice. Moreover the argument that TN on a d-dimensional hypercubic lattice scales as
N (d+1)/d suggests that the upper critical dimension for confident voting is infinite.
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